The A400M disaster

13:21 GMT, January 12, 2009 As the A400M disaster unfolds, the temptation becomes nearly overpowering to start pointing fingers, calling names and apportioning blame. Yet such a temptation must be resisted, because in the end it will amount to a sterile exercise. What matters much more now is to find ways to try and save the programme, for the sake of all of those involved.

Yet such an effort cannot possibly be launched and implemented without at least a cursory attempt at understanding what went wrong, and why. Failing to do so would ensure that the very same mistakes will be repeated over and over again, and for the very same reason.

The original requirement by several European air forces for a new generation transport aircraft, and one that would carry a significantly heavier payload than the C-130 Hercules and over longer distances, did made and still makes a lot of operational sense. While the vision of entire brigades and division being projected through airlift is of course baloney (and particularly so in an European context), the extreme importance of adequate air transport capabilities to sustain the increasingly more important peace support operations around the globe is plain for everybody to see. To have even a relatively modest deployment such as the ISAF mission to Afghanistan critically dependent on the good will of a private Russian air freight company is clearly not acceptable.

By the same token, the original decision to capitalise on the successful Airbus experience and have the new transport aircraft developed in Europe, rather than buying it from an American supplier, did made and still makes a lot of commercial and industrial sense.

The devil, as they say is in the details. As soon as the expected configuration of the A400M started to emerge, based on the harmonised requirements of the air forces, independent observers warned with a certain alarm that several aspects of the aircraft involved pretty formidable technical challenges. Under discussion was not the European industry’s capability to successfully tackle these challenges, but rather its ability to do so in time and on budget.

In this context, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to open a window of opportunity, with Russia and Ukraine desperate to find some cash to save the programme for the Antonov An-70 – an aircraft that comfortably met, and indeed exceeded the A400M’s specifications. Of course, the notion of buying a Russian/Ukrainian aircraft off-the-shelf was out of the question. Rather, Europe had a chance to repeat, on a much grander scale the exceedingly successful coup scored by Aermacchi with the Yak-130; namely, to buy an entire and nearly complete project (the Yak-130) literally for peanuts, modify it here and there, and then drop the alliance with the Russian manufacturer and proceed with the own design (the M346).

Pretty much the same scheme as regards the An-70 was seriously discussed at political level and came rather close to conclusion, but it was eventually abandoned. Although strategic considerations were mentioned at that time, there is little doubt that the real reason was the stern opposition by industry, which in its greed wanted the European nations to fund a (very costly) development programme starting from zero. The very same story was then repeated, on a smaller but equally dangerous scale, when it came to selecting the main contractor for the aircraft’s engines.

And now we are saddled with an aircraft, whose first flight (forget delivery and IOC) not even Nostradamus could predict, because – surprise, surprise! _ the European industry has apparently bitten more than it can chew in terms of developing and integrating the A400M’s power plant. Further, evidence is accumulating to the effect that even when the aircraft is actually turned into a really flying machine, it will not be able to satisfy the original requirements in terms of either payload or range. The entire programme would thus need to be completely rewritten, in terms of industrial structure, performance, time schedule and cost.

As already said, there indeed are excellent reasons for wanting to save the A400M, and to muster all available resources to that effect. This, however, would be under two capital conditions.

First, the programme must the rearranged on the basis on what the air forces need, and the taxpayer is prepared to fund – and not of what industry would like to have, or of what they think they could possibly deliver when they have a moment of time to spare.

Second and more important, for the European industry to be trusted to remain responsible for this programme, it would require a fundamental change in culture from their part. To say it bluntly, they must come to acknowledge that the air forces, the MoD and the taxpayers are their masters, and not their servants.

----

See also:

AIRBUS MILITARY and EADS propose a new approach for the A400M Programme
http://www.defpro.com/news/details/4780/

----

Feel free to comment this article in the A400m discussion group.
http://www.defpro.com/groups/newthread/a400m_military_transporter/ 
 

For more information click here