Global Strike Command Assumes Deterrent Missions

09:12 GMT, December 4, 2009 On 1 December 2009, the new US Air Force Global Strike Command formally assumed nuclear deterrence missions with land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The Command assumed command and responsibility for 20th Air Force and its three missile wings located at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming; at Maelstrom Air Force Base in Montana; at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota; as well as the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The Command will later take over the B-52 and B-2 bombers as well.

The Global Strike Command’s Commander, Lt.Gen. Frank G. Klotz described the Command’s responsibilities and roles in a recent speech at the Air Force Association (AFA) Global Warfare Symposium. Excerpts follow.


The US Air Force’s newest major command, Air Force Global Strike Command, will very shortly assume responsibility for the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, and then a little bit later in the new year the long range nuclear capable bombers. As we do so, we will become ardent champions for both weapon systems as well as for the women and men who operate, maintain, secure and support them.

Both the ICBM and the bomber legs of the strategic nuclear triad have been and most importantly remain essential and indispensable components of our nation’s armed forces. Each makes important and each makes unique contributions to the security of our nation, as well as that of our allies and our friends. I’d like to focus my comments on the current status and the future of the ICBM force.

Air Force Global Strike Command was established as part of a broader road map developed by Secretary of the Air Force Mike Donley and our Chief of Staff, General Nordy Schwartz, to refocus our efforts on the nuclear enterprise.

The command was established to clearly align the ICBM and nuclear capable bomber missions and global strike forces under a single chain of command, providing focused oversight and advocacy for the Air Force’s long range nuclear systems.

Since the formal activation on the 7th of August of this year at Barksdale Air Force Base, the Airmen of Global Strike command have been very busy with building a model major command with all eyes firmly fixed on the assumption of the ICBM mission on December 1st. We are confident that this transition will be
seamless.

Even though the Cold War has ended, the world remains a dangerous and uncertain place. For this reason the strategic nuclear triad continues to be the foundation of our national deterrent posture. Each one of the triad’s three legs -- the intercontinental ballistic missile; the long range bomber; and the sea-launched ballistic missile -- makes a unique and complementary contribution to our national security.

Now of those three legs of the strategic triad, the ICBM is the most available and the most responsive to the national leadership. It’s continuously on alert. It’s deployed in 450 widely disbursed locations so its overall size and characteristics present any potential adversary with an almost insurmountable challenge should he contemplate attacking the United States. Because he cannot disarm the ICBM force without nearly exhausting or using up his own forces in the process, and at the same time leaving himself vulnerable to our remaining nuclear forces, he has no incentive to strike in the first place. That’s the point.

The ICBM thus contributes immeasurably to both deterrence and maybe even more importantly, to stability in a crisis. So sustainment of a safe, secure and credible ICBM force remains a critical Air Force mission and responsibility. To that end over the past several years we’ve been engaged in a roughly $7 billion multi-year program to refurbish or modernize practically every inch of the Minuteman III missile from the top of its nose cones to the bottom of its first stage nozzles. Let me give some examples.

All three rocket motors have been overhauled with new propellant and the guidance system has been updated with new electronics, and the propulsion system rocket engine or the post-boost vehicle for my space friends, is undergoing life extension, and the newer warheads previously used on the recently deactivated Peacekeeper missile, are being deployed on a portion of the Minuteman fleet.

In addition, other aspects of the overall weapon system have benefited from substantial investment. To ensure connectivity with the national senior leadership, we’ve updated our capability to receive very low frequency and MilStar communications, and we’re poised to take advantage of the advanced, extremely high frequency or AEHF satellite communications system once it comes on line.

To enhance the survivability of the weapons system, we are equipping missile alert and launch facilities with new environmental control systems, with new diesel panels and new electrical panels and new batteries. These measures will not only extend the service life of the missile system, they will also enhance its maintainability and reduce the cost of ownership.

Equally important, significant steps are being taken to enhance security in virtually every facet of the ICBM system. Work was recently completed on reinforcing the concrete head works at each launch facility, and progress continues on deploying a modified personnel access hatch designed to button up a missile silo much more quickly in case of an emergency. Further, programs are underway to install security surveillance cameras at all the remote launch facilities as well as the missile alert facilities. In addition, feasibility studies have been conducted to assess the possibility of performing code changes at all sites in the field remotely. If implemented, this task of changing codes will take a matter of hours as opposed to days as is currently the case to carry out this recurring task, and thereby reducing the attendant security risks of opening up each launch facility.

These of course are very significant programs, but as any logistician will readily tell you, one area that is often overlooked and underappreciated, and therefore not adequately funded in virtually every weapon system is support equipment. The Minuteman is no exception.

Take, for example, the reentry test set of the RSTS. Every weapon deployed to the missile field requires a thorough checkout from this unique, one of a kind piece of equipment. As such, it’s the long pole in the tent for virtually any maintenance activity involving removal and replacement of a warhead. Without it, Roger Berg’s 20th Air Force Team cannot put a single missile on alert.

The RS test set is, quite frankly, in critical condition and on life support. An earlier attempt to field a replacement system failed. Recent initiatives taken by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, and by Air Force Materiel Command, as well as our industry partners promised to enhance the performance of the RS test set and its life span until a new, and hopefully this time successful replacement can be developed.

But even if we resolve this particular hardware problem, it’s vitally important to keep focused, sustained attention on the remainder of the Minuteman’s test equipment, its handling equipment, and its transportation equipment to ensure we don’t find ourselves in another life support situation.

Now all the measures I just described were originally designed to sustain the Minuteman III force through the year 2020. In response to congressional direction, the Air Force is currently exploring the steps necessary to sustain Minuteman III until at least 2030.

Air Force Global Strike Command and 20th Air Force will continue partnering with Air Force Materiel Command and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center to refine projections about the potential service life of the motors and other hardware after undergoing the current upgrade programs. But it’s probably too early to say with great confidence exactly how long the Minuteman system will be serviceable. The Air Force will continue to conduct a comprehensive program to inspect missile and re-entry system components for signs of aging and to perform periodic operational tests, both in the missile field as well as unarmed test flights from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

Now even if the Minuteman continues to have operational utility to 2030 and beyond, some additional upgrades to the system beyond those currently underway may be both reasonable and prudent. Let me give you an example.

The current guidance system uses 1960s, maybe 1970s technology - gyroscopes and accelerometers that have reached the practical limits in terms of their accuracy, improvement possible and their maintainability. Insertion of modern technology into the guidance systems could potentially extend the mean time between failures by an order of magnitude, drastically reducing maintenance cost, enhancing security, and improving accuracy of our re-entry systems.

Modern guidance systems would also introduce up-to-date best maintenance practices that would greatly reduce the maintenance time and security manpower required to repair missiles in the field. Similarly, command and control and security monitoring systems would benefit greatly from modern approaches to further reduced manpower requirements and cost while enhancing overall weapon system safety.

So much like the B-52, which will also be a critical, important part of Air Force Global Strike Command, the Minuteman force must take advantage of modern technologies and operational practices and continue to evolve in order to keep pace with the dwindling resources and demands to support newer capabilities and missions.

And we must also address future needs. While we work to sustain the Minuteman to 2030, it’s not too early to begin again seriously considering what the next generation f an intercontinental ballistic missile would look like. Advances in technology suggest the possibility of an ICBM or ICBM-like system of greater range and greater flexibility, while maintaining the enduring attributes of rapid response, high reliability and assured penetration of defences.

At the same time, maintenance, security and command and control concepts can most certainly be reengineered to reduce overall manpower and overall costs, again, while enhancing nuclear assurety and safety.

The ICBM, like its bomber counterpart, has the potential in the future to fill a variety of roles. This suggests some pretty exciting possibilities, and Air Force Global Strike Command was created to strengthen the advocacy for the ICBM mission both now and for in the future. And for the record, that’s exactly what we intend to do.

Now regardless, we cannot afford to sit idly by while the Minuteman force continues to age. To quote my former boss and good friend, Mr. Frank Miller, and I quote, “It’s all well and good to assert that the ICBM force continues to fill a needed national mission, but such statements of policy cannot ensure that the force will be available to carry out its identified mission. If there is to be an ICBM force, in the future it will exist only if efforts to design and fund a major upgrade or follow-on to the Minuteman system are undertaken promptly. Over time the failure to do so will constitute a de facto decision to permit the Minuteman system to atrophy slowly without replacement. Despite the dedicated efforts of the officers and enlisted members of the force it will inevitably waste away.” A long quote, but I think a very strong quote.

Which brings to mind another equally important point: We also need to invest in our work force -- current and future -- to ensure we bring the right skills, the right experience, the right leadership together to create and maintain the capabilities our nation needs. With only three wings to draw from we must be very deliberate in how we develop our ICBM expertise. This is a top priority for Global Strike Command.

Despite the fact that we live in a world very different from the Cold War, this era still requires the ICBM and its unique capabilities as a credible deterrent for the United States and as assurance to its allies and friends around the world. Recently completed and ongoing programs will give the United States the continued assurance of a ready and capable force until at least 2020, and with further modernization the force can be extended until 2030 as required. But we must also be attentive for the needs of an effective deterrent beyond that date.